IT that keeps product moving, volumes measured, nominations on time.IT that keeps productmovingvolumesmeasurednominationsontime
A hardened IT side and a controlled IT/OT boundary, so a phishing email never decides whether your line keeps flowing.
Midstream & pipeline IT
The line flows on SCADA. The business runs on IT.
Control rooms get the attention, but scheduling, gas measurement, contracts and invoicing all run on the corporate network, and those systems decide whether you can keep operating with confidence. Here's what midstream depends on day to day, how the IT side gets compromised, what we change and what you can show regulators and insurers afterward.
01 · The pressure
Nominations, measurement and billing never pause
Shippers nominate volumes on deadlines, schedulers confirm them, and measurement analysts validate chart and EFM data from meters across the system before allocations close. Accounting turns all of it into invoices and producer statements. If those business systems go down or can't be trusted, it doesn't matter that the SCADA is healthy. You can't confirm what moved or bill for it, and leadership has to decide whether running blind is acceptable.
- Nomination and scheduling deadlines every gas day
- Meter data validated before allocations close
- Producer statements and invoices depend on IT
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02 · How it breaks
Dual-homed servers and contractor VPN accounts
The weak spots are usually on the boundary. A historian server has one network card on the business LAN and another on the control network. An integrator's VPN account from a project years ago still works and has no MFA. Engineers copy files between networks on USB drives because there's no approved path. A scheduler's mailbox gets phished and the attacker sits quietly in Microsoft 365, mapping who has access to what before moving.
- Historian servers bridging business and control LANs
- Old integrator VPN accounts without MFA
- USB transfers filling in for a real file path
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03 · What we change
Segmentation, jump hosts and monitored identity
We work with your controls team to put a demilitarized zone between business and control networks, so historians and data replicas sit in the middle and nothing routes straight through. Remote and vendor access goes through MFA-protected jump hosts with session recording. Corporate identities get phishing-resistant MFA and privileged access controls, endpoints get managed detection and response, and backups become immutable and tested. We document all of it in terms that map to your security program.
- IT/OT DMZ for historians and data replication
- Recorded jump-host sessions for every vendor
- Immutable, tested backups of business systems
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04 · The after
Evidence ready when the auditor or underwriter asks
After the work, an infection on a laptop in the accounting office stays an IT incident and never becomes an operational decision. If you're a TSA-designated covered operator, you have architecture diagrams, access records and tested recovery results to support your cybersecurity implementation plan and assessments. Insurers get concrete answers on segmentation, MFA and backups. Your controls engineers keep authority over the control network, with a clear, logged handoff at the boundary.
- IT incidents contained before reaching operations
- Records that support TSA directive assessments
- Clear ownership between IT and controls teams
AVEVA PI SystemQuorum FlowcalQuorum PGASEsri ArcGISEnverusMicrosoft 365